基于GMM模型的经理管理防御与代理成本关系研究
首发时间:2017-05-16
摘要:本文首先用主成分分析法对经理管理防御指数进行定义,在此基础上,以中国A股上市非金融企业为研究对象,选取2011-2015年数据作为研究样本,通过动态面板数据分析来探讨经理管理防御与代理成本间的作用机理。研究发现:经理管理防御水平越高,则企业代理成本越高;短期负债与现金股利对经理代理成本有很显著的正向调节作用。该研究在对管理防御理论进行补充的同时,可以为股东在制定激励和约束机制时提供一定的参考。
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The Relation between Managerial Entrenchment and Agency Costs based on GMM model
Abstract:Based on defining the managerial entrenchment, which is measured using a principal component analysis (PCA)-derived index, this study is conducted using dynamic panel data from China A-share listed non-financial companies. Overall, our results suggest that higher managerial entrenchment leads to greater agency costs; short-term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices in reducing the costs of manager-shareholder agency conflict.
Keywords: managerial entrenchment agency costs PCA GMM model
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No.4732634119922514****
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基于GMM模型的经理管理防御与代理成本关系研究
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