家族企业公司治理与IPO抑价
首发时间:2016-05-19
摘要:本文研究家族企业公司治理对IPO抑价率的影响。实证研究结果表明,在控制其他因素的情况下,家族企业的IPO抑价率在10%的显著水平上低于非家族企业,对家族企业进行进一步细分发现,成立年限较短的家族企业的IPO抑价率低于其他类型企业,拥有家族CEO的家族企业的IPO抑价率低于其他类型企业。在家族企业子样本中,若CEO为非家族成员将会提高其IPO抑价率;当家族成员在董事会中比例增加时,将缓解非家族CEO对IPO抑价率的影响。研究表明家族企业的家族化经营管理模式能可靠地向投资者传递了企业内在价值信息,从而降低IPO抑价。
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Family Firms' Corporate Governance and IPO 'Underpricing'
Abstract:The research purpose of the paper is to find out the impact of family firms' corporate governance on the IPO underpricing level. The empirical findings suggest that, when controlling for other factors, the IPO underpricing level of family firms are lower than non-family firms at the 10% significance level. After further subdividing the family firms, the findings suggest that the young family firms' IPO underpricing level are lower than other types of firms. Also, the IPO underpricing level of family firms in which the CEOs are family member are lower than other types of firms. In the subsample of family firms, the empirical results suggest that non-family member CEO will increase the IPO underpricing. However, this effect is weakened by the increase in the percentage of family directors in the board. Overall, the empirical findings support the hypothesis that the involvement of the family members in family firms' management can be a signal to investors to deliver the information about firms' true value, and thus decrease the degree of IPO underpricing.
Keywords: Finance Family Firm Corporate Governance IPO Underpricing
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No.4689873114778414****
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