智能电网通信干扰攻击的动态博弈策略
首发时间:2015-07-16
摘要:本文主要研究智能电网通信干扰攻击与防御行为的相互作用。根据攻防双方能力有限性和攻防行为多阶段性等特点,本项工作使用动态博弈理论当中的多阶段的双人零和博弈来描述攻防过程。理论分析与实验仿真表明:通过在每个阶段选择最优策略,攻击者和防御者都可以最大程度维护自身利益,从而达到整个动态博弈的纳什均衡解。
For information in English, please click here
Dynamic game strategy for jamming attack in smart grid communications
Abstract:This paper analyzes the cyber attack and defense process in smart grid communications. Regarding the limited ability of action and the multi-stage characteristic of attack/defense, a multi-stage two-person zero-sum game model of dynamic game theory is adopted to describe the attack and defense process. The theoretical analysis and simulation results demonstrate that by choosing the optimal strategies in each stage the attacker and defender can both maximize their benefits. And an overall Nash equilibrium will be achieved.
Keywords: smart grid communications jamming attack dynamic game multi-stage zero-sum game
论文图表:
引用
No.4649929222691436****
同行评议
勘误表
智能电网通信干扰攻击的动态博弈策略
评论
全部评论